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When Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),'
it announced a federal commitment to combat discrimination on the
basis of sex and marital status2 in credit granting. That commitment
was reaffirmed and broadened in 1976 when the ECOA was amended.3
But difficulties with implementation remain. The goal of the Act
is not simply to ameliorate blatant discrimination, but also to facili-
tate equal access to credit for previously excluded groups by remov-
ing practices that have disparate effects. 4 As a result, litigation under
the ECOA will raise in the credit context the difficult issues posed
by objective screening and the business necessity defense-issues that
have been the focus of litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 5 Absent evidence of blatant and deliberate discrimina-
1. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f
(1976)).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) ("It is the purpose of this Act to
require that financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit
make that credit equally available to all credit-worthy customers without regard to sex
or marital status.")
3. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976)).
The 1976 Amendments extended the Act's coverage to discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, and age, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976), and strengthened
the Act's enforcement provisions, id. § 1691e.
4. The legislative history of the 1976 Amendments explicitly endorses the "effects
test," developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (1976), as a standard for finding discrimination:
The prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or na-
tional origin are unqualified. In the Committee's view, these characteristics are
totally unrelated to creditworthiness and cannot be considered by any creditor. In
determining the existence of discrimination on these grounds,... courts or agencies
are free to look at the effects of a creditor's practices as well as the creditor's motives
or conduct in individual transactions. Thus judicial constructions of anti-discrimina-
tion legislation in the employment field, in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power
Company ... .and Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody . . . .are intended to serve
as guides in the application of this Act, especially with respect to the allocations of
burdens of proof.
S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1975) (footnote and citations omitted) [herein-
after cited as Senate Report]; see H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as House Report]; 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a), at 459 n.7 (1977). For discussions
of the "effects test" in the credit context, see, e.g., Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and the "Effects" Test, 95 BANKING L.J. 241 (1978); Hsia, The Effects Test: New
Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 777, 791-95 (1977).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976).
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tion, the ECOA requires judgments about who should bear the cost
of eliminating discriminatory effects. This Note argues that placing
the burden on creditors, through strict enforcement of the ECOA,
is warranted. Strict enforcement will not only help to eradicate dis-
crimination, but will also lead to changes in credit procedures that
ultimately advance the creditors' own interests.
The use of scored objective tests for screening credit applicants
makes it unusually difficult to identify and remedy discrimination.
These statistically derived, facially neutral6 screening techniques are
often used instead of subjective screening by an individual evaluator; 7
proponents claim that they decrease screening costs and increase pre-
dictive accuracys and thus serve to eliminate discrimination. 9 But,
as litigation under Title VII has indicated, many problems of dis-
criminatory impact have continued to arise despite the use of objec-
tive screening.10 There remains a basic tension between the central
6. The term "facially neutral" as applied in employment discrimination cases has been
used to describe evaluative factors or processes that (1) bear no explicit relationship to
group membership, usually defined by an immutable characteristic such as race or sex,
but (2) may be sufficiently correlated with such group membership that, absent other
explanation, a claim of neutrality in their use is undercut.
7. See Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior With Statistical In-
ference and Individualized Judgment, 88 Y,.E L.J. 1408, 1420-21 (1979) (distinguishing
"statistical" and "clinical" predictive techniques).
8. Cf. Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72
COLUM. L. REv. 900, 900 (1972) (errors in selection are more costly when jobs are more
complex).
9. Cf. id. (use of objective criteria avoids unintentional bias often found in subjective
employment decisions).
10. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (job placement tests
having disparate impact were insufficiently validated); United States v. City of Chicago,
573 F.2d 416, 425-26 (7th Cir. 1978) (reversing finding of no discrimination and remanding
for findings of fact regarding whether functions tested in police captain's promotional
exam were part of job function and reflected importance to job). In addition to applying
the effects test to objectively scored tests, the courts have applied it routinely in two other
kinds of cases involving putative objective criteria used to determine access to jobs. The
first kind are cases in which unscored objective criteria of achievement, such as the high
school diploma required by employers in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
or other factors such as arrest records, convictions, or garnishments, operate as exclu-
sionary devices, see, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975)
(convictions); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrests); Johnson v. Pike, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(garnishments). The second kind of case involves the use of unstructured criteria to
allocate opportunities. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 302
(1977) (only general guidance given to principals to hire most competent teachers; in-
tangibles such as "'personality, disposition, appearance, poise, voice, articulation, and
ability to deal with people' counted heavily"). The courts have also addressed the issue of
whether the effects test applies to the use of sex-related criteria in the allocation of job
benefits. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (denial of pregnancy disability
benefits and back pay to workers on pregnancy leave not discrimination but loss of
seniority for same time off is sex discrimination); General Elec. Co. V. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (denial of pregnancy health and disability benefits not sex discrimination at
least when men do not receive health benefits of greater value than women when
pregnancy excluded from coverage).
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principle of equality, which demands that scarce and valuable re-
sources be allocated according to individual qualification, and the
idea that statistical prediction, derived from broad group character-
istics, is a valid means for making such a determination.
This Note will argue that judicial holdings with respect to statisti-
cal prediction in Title VII cases articulate principles that can be
extended to consumer credit-screening transactions subject to the
ECOA. In Title VII cases, which involve discrimination in employ-
ment, the judiciary has not deferred to the appearance of objectivity
and has not relied wholly on rigid, technical methods of statistical
analysis. Instead the courts have judged the screening transaction
as a whole." By examining the standards implicit in Title VII cases,
this Note derives an analogous test for credit scoring and determines
the stringency with which that test should apply. Part I describes
consumer credit scoring and analyzes the congressional purpose that
underlies the "effects test" that was incorporated in the ECOA
Amendments. Part II describes the effects test as it is used in the
employment context and identifies the similarities and differences
between employment and consumer credit. Finally, Part III proposes
a method for applying the test to the credit-scoring context.
I. Consumer Credit Decisionmaking and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act
The process of consumer credit screening has three interrelated
phases-recruitment or solicitation, 1 evaluation, 3 and monitoring
and feedback.' 4 Although discrimination is found in all three phases
of the process, the terms of the ECOA focus primarily on evalua-
tion.' 5 The success of the ECOA depends on an understanding of
credit evaluation and the sources of discrimination in that process.
11. See pp. 1462-69 infra.
12. Recruitment or solicitation refers to all the means by which a creditor attracts
applications. The creditor's general advertising strategy is one factor that influences the
applications it receives. See R. COLE, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT
351 (5th ed. 1976).
13. Evaluation is the process by which creditors decide to accept or reject an applica-
tion. See generally id. at 245-347 (discussing evaluative factors in credit investigation,
means and shortcomings of investigation and information verification, and techniques of
evaluation).
14. Monitoring and feedback lead to two types of actions by the creditor. First, the
creditor may terminate or pursue collection strategies for accounts that fail to maintain
a good payment record. Id. at 363-87. Second, the creditor uses past experience with ac-
counts to guide his subsequent solicitation and evaluation procedures. Id. at 308-22.
15. The Act prohibits discrimination with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976); however, most of its specific provisions and most provisions
of the implementing regulations issued by the Federal Reserve Board, see Regulation B,
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A. Consumer Credit Evaluation
Credit evaluation is a two-tiered process. First, the creditor screens
out those applicants who, from the point of view of the creditor, are
bad risks. They include people who are apparently unwilling or un-
able to meet their obligations and also those against whom the creditor
would be unable to assert an effective claim in the event of default.:6
The screening process may require verification of information pro-
vided by the applicant or further investigation through other sources. 17
During the second stage of the process, the creditor evaluates his
applicant pool to achieve a portfolio of debtors with an expected
likelihood of repayment consistent with that creditor's desired risk
level.18
Creditors employ two basic methods to screen credit applicants:
they may rely on subjective evaluations of individual applicants' 9
or on standardized screening devices that use statistical analysis of
the creditor's past experience. The statistical screening devices, which
are generally referred to as credit scoring,2 0 are most often used by
12 C.F.R. § 202 (1978), pertain to the information that a creditor may request of an
applicant, the use to which permissible information may be put, and a creditor's duties
to a rejected applicant.
16. See R. COLE, sulJra note 12, at 245-307. In addition to typical screening of ap-
plicants for positive indicators of financial ability and a satisfactory history of meeting
obligations, the creditor attempts to screen out judgment-proof or fraudulent applicants
who, it is reasonable to infer, cause the most substantial losses in the event of default. Cf.
Ross, The Credit Card's Painful Coming-of-Age, FORTUNE, Oct. 1971, at IlI (unsolicited
mailing of bank cards led to substantial losses from fraudulent use).
17. See R. COLE, supra note 12, at 267-307 (discussing direct investigation with references
provided by applicant and indirect verification through credit-reporting agency).
18. Id. at 308-22 (discussing means of risk evaluation including credit officer appraisal,
credit grading, and credit scoring). Creditors, finding it uneconomical to vary prices ac-
cording to differences in contractual terms and perceived risks, tend to establish a "house"
interest rate and lend only to those who meet a minimum risk level; consequently interest
rates vary more among lenders than they do among the customers of one lender. NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 112-13 (1972).
The overall effect is stratification of the credit industry so that borrowers perceived as
high risks obtain credit from creditors, such as finance companies, who offer credit at
higher interest rates. See R. COLE, supra note 12, at 102-03.
19. See R. COLE, supra note 12, at 308-19.
20. Id. at 319-22. Credit scoring, which is statistically derived, is thus distinguished
from credit grading, which merely systematizes the subjective standards chosen by the
creditor. Id. at 312-22; see 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(1) (1978):
Empirically derived credit system.
(1) The term means a credit scoring system that evaluates an applicant's credit-
worthiness primarily by allocating points.., to key attributes describing the applicant
and other aspects of the transaction. In such a system, the points . . . assigned to
each attribute, and hence the entire score:
(i) Are derived from an empirical comparison of sample groups or the population
of creditworthy and noncreditworthy applicants of a creditor who applied for credit
within a reasonable preceding period of time; and
(ii) Determine alone or in conjunction with an evaluation of additional informa-
tion about the applicant, whether an applicant is deemed creditworthy.
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creditors handling a large volume of consumer debt and screening
numerous applicants. 2t Therefore, a discriminatory credit-scoring sys-
tem will have a more significant impact than a single subjective
process. In addition, credit scoring creates more difficult analytical
problems when the law seeks to end discrimination in the credit
industry.
In credit scoring, the applicant is scored on a combination of char-
acteristics to determine whether he meets the creditor's predetermined
risk level. A scoring scheme typically employs six to twelve variables
relating risk of nonpayment to attributes possessed by the applicant
or associated with the transaction. These variables may involve the
terms of the loan, credit and financial references, income, job status,
residence, or a variety of other factors. -2 The score that an applicant
receives on each variable is derived from the probability of bad
payment associated with that variable in the creditor's pool of past
credit recipients. 23
21. Although the goals of uniform treatment of applicants and systematic prediction
of risk are no doubt factors in a creditor's decision to adopt a credit-scoring system, effi-
ciency, scale, and computer capabilities may play a larger role in that decision. See, e.g.,
R. Biborosch, Numerical Credit Scoring (pt. 1) (speech at Installment Credit Conference
of American Bankers Association), reprinted in CREDIT WORLD, June 1965, at 6-9 (First
Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. first moved to credit-grading procedure and
systematic numerical scoring to accommodate substantial volume of postwar business at
time when trained and experienced credit personnel were unavailable or drew salaries
higher than bank budgeted); Wells, New Customer Credit Pointing System (Jan. 10, 1963)
(presentation at Second Consumer Credit Symposium, University of Pennsylvania), re-
printed in Numerical Pointing Plans for Evaluating Consumer Credit Risks (pamphlet on
file with Yale Law Journal) (describing principles of credit-scoring system developed by
mail-order business to compensate for lack of face-to-face screening capabilities and to
avoid time and costs entailed in ordering credit reports; generally recommending its use
for volume operations in retail credit field). See generally STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATION IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 96 (Supp. 1976)
(credit scoring adopted as result of economic forces calling for lowest possible costs and
highest possible volume and political pressure aimed at avoiding discrimination).
22. See D. DURAND, RISK ELEMENTS IN CONSUMER INSTALLMENT FINANCING 44-82 (tech. ed.
1941); Myers & Forgy, The Development of Numerical Credit Evaluation Systems, 58 Am.
STATISTICAL A.J. 799, 802 (1963); Smith, Measuring Risk in Consumer Installment Credit,
11 MANAGEMENT SCI. 327, 332 (1964).
23. Although the numerical credit-scoring scheme may be developed with any of
several mathematical techniques, the fundamental procedure for deriving such a scheme
is a three-step process. The first step is to determine on the basis of a sample of past
credit users which variables or factors retained in the file on credit users demonstrate a
mathematically meaningful relationship with the probability of failure to make timely
voluntary payment. The second step is to devise a scoring scheme employing the variables
that proved to be predictive. A weight for each variable and a score for each possible
category subsumed by the variable are assigned based on the predictive values obtained.
Combining the values of each attribute and any weighting given to the variables, the
numerical scoring scheme assigns a single, typically additive score for any combination of
attributes. This score represents the probability that a credit user in the creditor's file who
possesses the combined attributes is a good credit risk. Ideally that probability is tested
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A credit-scoring scheme reveals explicitly the factors considered in
decisionmaking. This would seem to make discrimination on the
basis of the applicant's sex or race more difficult than in subjective
screening by a credit evaluator.24 On the other hand, the com-
plexity of credit-scoring systems increases the chances that they will
intentionally or inadvertently be used to impose disadvantages on
creditworthy members of statutorily protected classes, 25 notably racial
minorities and women. In many credit-scoring schemes, the creditor's
preference for certain kinds of credit users,26 or his intuition about
against a random split sample of previous credit users or against a sample of subsequent
credit users.
The third step in credit scoring is estimating the point below which the probable
losses associated with bad accounts are equal to or exceed the aggregate desired gain from
good accounts. A scoring scheme may be used as a simple elimination device or it may
be constructed so that the lowest-scoring applicants are automatically rejected, the highest
scoring are automatically accepted, and the middle range are held for closer examination.
See Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 371,
375-77, 387-404 (1978); Myers & Forgy, supra note 22; Smith, supra note 22.
24. It has been argued that objective, empirically derived systems are superior tojudgmental systems, and preferable from the viewpoint of discrimination law, because a
credit officer's judgment is based on imperfect analysis and distorted recollection of in-
formation that is, in addition, likely to be out-of-date. Hsia, supra note 23, at 372-75.
However, a statistical device like credit scoring can lead to systematic mismeasurement,
see pp. 1455-58 infra, and is not necessarily preferable on policy grounds. For discussion
of policy considerations associated with the decision to use statistical or clinical predic-
tion, see Underwood, supra note 7, at 1420-32.
25. See Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1974)
(statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, member Federal Reserve Board) (seemingly innocent
inquiry regarding address may be used by creditor to discount or avoid neighborhoods
with high minority population) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings]; Chandler & Ewert,
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1976),
discussed in Proceedings of ABA National Institute on Consumer Credit, 33 Bus. LAW.
1086, 1090-1104 (1978) (construct of credit-scoring systems with four alternative models-
one aggregating male and female performance, one distinguishing sex with dichotomous
variables, one based on males only, and one based on females only-reveals that correlation
of female performance with predictive variables is different from that of males and
that aggregate model underpredicts good performance of females) (on file with Yale Law
Journal); Eisenbeis, Problems in Applying Discriminant Analysis in Credit Scoring Models
(1977) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Economics Study No. 94)
(shortcomings of credit-scoring models include serious problems of bias resulting from
estimation based on truncated sample).
26. Such preferences may be expressed in subtle ways that have discriminatory effects.
Some creditors who use occupation as a variable in credit-scoring schemes score occupa-
tion by subgroupings such as professional, semiprofessional, managerial, clerical, laborer,
etc. Although some occupations indisputably fall into one subgrouping or another, many
occupations could be placed in more than one. For example, an accountant or a nurse
might be defined as professional or semiprofessional, and an administrative assistant could
be managerial or clerical. Telephone interview with Sally Gold, attorney, Division of
Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 30, 1979). The decision to place an occupation in professional or man-
agerial categories rather than semiprofessional or clerical, is in effect a decision to benefit
the particular occupation by attributing to it the aggregate score that the category sub-
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the shortcomings of his data,2 7 limits the empirically derived measures.
Often the creditor does not define the variables in the system to
account for the full range of possibilities.
Even if the creditor faithfully relies on his available data, the
derived scores may not be correct predictors of creditworthiness for
members of protected classes. Often, particular predictive variables
correlate differently with repayment behavior for white males than
for other classes of applicants. This effect will be fairly obvious
when a variable that is valued highly is possessed in low proportion
by protected classes or vice versa.28 But the differential may not al-
ways be easy to perceive.29 In either case, inadequate prediction for
protected classes is the result 30 because patterns of geographic dis-
suming the higher status occupations is likely to achieve. For a description of techniques
by which constraints can be imposed on empirical derivation, and variables can be re-
grouped and reordered in computer data analysis, see generally N. NIE, C. HuLL, J.
JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89-126
(5th ed. 1975).
In addition to expressing preferences at the stage of subcategorizing occupations, a
creditor who exercises discretion when interpreting individual applications might decide,
for example, whether an "administrative assistant" fits managerial or clerical subcate-
gories by considering the sex of the applicant which might be discerned from the
applicant's name.
27. The foundation of such an intuition may be sound or unsound. Two reasons for
employing constraints arise frequently. First, there may be so few previous cases in a
subcategory that it is statistically unreliable. See generally H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS
162 (2d ed. 1972) (with very small samples, extreme results can occur quite frequently by
chance). Second, the creditor's sample may not include a portion of the population that
is now applying. Hsia, supra note 23, at 389-91, 391 n.75, 393-98 (problem of estimation
and technique for compensation with sample truncated by exclusion of previously rejected
applicants; requirement that accounts achieve given age to yield useful information;
problem of sample rendered unrepresentative by passage of time and change in demo-
graphic factors); Eisenbeis, supra note 25, at 20-22 (problem of estimation with truncated
sample).
28. The most prominent example is the use of zip codes or residence regions that
correspond to racial residential patterning and the consequent assignment of a low score
to minority areas. See, e.g., Robinson, Zip Code Factor in Penney's Credit Checks, Raleigh
Times, June 28, 1977, at 1-A; Wilcox, U.S. Investigates Credit Card Redlining, Detroit
News, Aug. 17, 1977, at 3-A, col. 1.
29. See Chandler & Ewert, supra note 25, at 6-10 (scoring model shows different pre-
dictive weights for model scoring system based on female subpopulation only compared
with model based on male and female populations combined and compared with model
derived from males only).
30. In this context, "inadequate prediction" refers to a scoring system's inability to
identify the same percentage of successes in each group of the population. It is not over-
all accuracy of a scoring system compared with other procedures that is at issue in this
discussion. The issue here is the legitimacy of using systems that may be expected to
systematically predict a lower proportion of successes for previously disadvantaged groups
than for historically advantaged groups. However, if a system is highly inaccurate, its
legitimacy may be further questioned on that ground alone. See generally Underwood,
supra note 7, at 1410-12.
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tribution,U' economic life cycles,3 2 and financial practices33 among
protected groups differ from the patterns of those characteristics among
white males. For example, although home ownership may be a good
indicator that a given applicant is a good risk, holding financial abil-
ity constant, more white men will have acquired ownership of per-
sonal residences than will women or minorities.34 As a result, home
ownership probably identifies a larger proportion of financially re-
sponsible white males than of financially responsible women and
minorities.
Inadequate prediction of female or minority credit performance
may be amplified in two ways by a creditor who has a history of
excluding women or minorities. First, if the creditor relies on a
scoring scheme based on a sample composed predominantly of white,
male credit recipients, he penalizes minority and female applicants
for not possessing the positive predictors for white males that are
31. M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 10-11 (1976) (racial minorities tend to
live in racially segregated neighborhoods in central cities and adjacent suburban areas
regardless of income).
32. Goulet, Credit Potential of Women, 9 J. CONSUMER CREDIT MANAGEMENT 102, 102-06
(1978) (women may be expected to have different credit demand schedules and to differ in
relevant attributes; for example, because many women time credit-market activity to
coincide with family responsibilities, their work careers average 10 years less than men
and their entry into market tends to occur at later age).
33. Although there appears to be no systematic data on patterns of financial practice
and credit use according to sex and race, evidence on sex and race discrimination in the
credit industry indicates that credit-history characteristics will vary considerably accord-
ing to sex and race. Compared to white males, women and minorities will have borrowed
less, from sources of lesser quality, and usually at higher interest rates, regardless of
financial capability or other indicators of financial responsibility. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER
OF CURRENCY, FAIR HOUSING LENDING PRACTICES PILOT PROJECT (1975), reprinted in Hear-
ings on S.483, S.1900, S.1927, S.1961 and H.R. 5616 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
481-526 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings] (disparities in rejection rate
indicated for minorities, as compared to nonminorities, by tables with variables of race,
income, and assets); NATIONAL COMssSSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 18, at 151-
60 (clear anecdotal evidence on sex discrimination; equivocal evidence on race); Gates,
Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. REV. 412 (1974)
(survey of credit discrimination encountered by women and evaluation of factors that
must be confronted in finding solution to discrimination).
34. See Chandler & Ewert, supra note 25, at 8-9. Using a sample drawn from 2,000
credit applicants to a large metropolitan bank issuing credit cards, Chandler and Ewert
found that 15.7% of the females in the sample reported owning their own homes, as
compared with 24.3% of the males. Id. Of those who possessed their own homes, 89% of
the females showed good credit performance and only 74% of the males had good
performance. Id. These results would indicate that women who own their own homes are
a very good risk. It indicates nothing about the performance of women who do not own
their own homes or who do not possess other attributes that are positive for white males.
For example, Chandler and Ewert found that although more women in the sample (58.8%)
were classed as low income than men (23.6%), the percentage of low-income females who
had good credit performance (60%) was higher than the percentage of low-income males
who had good credit performance (49%). Id.
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difficult and time consuming to acquire. Second, if the creditor de-
fines, for estimation purposes, the dependent variable "uncredit-
worthy" to include not only those individuals in the sample who
have met some criteria of bad payment behavior but also those who
have been rejected in past applications for credit and, therefore,
never had an opportunity to perform,35 this creditor, in effect, assigns
negative value to attributes possessed in high proportion by minorities
or women regardless of the actual correlation between these attributes
and payment behavior.
On the basis of the foregoing factors, we may infer that objective
credit-scoring devices presently used by many creditors will not iden-
tify creditworthy members of disadvantaged groups as effectively as
they identify creditworthy white males. The particular attributes as-
sociated with group membership, which necessarily affect measure-
ment devices, make this outcome virtually certain. As a result, en-
forcement of the ECOA raises problems, like those faced in other
contexts, that concern structuring scoring systems properly to treat
all equally qualified applicants equally.36
35. The fact that scoring is necessarily derived from samples of past credit users has
always been a concern in credit prediction. See, e.g., D. DURAND, supra note 22, at 7; Hsia,
supra note 23, at 389-91 (sampling); id. at 393-98 (techniques to adjust for lack of in-
formation on rejects); Smith, supra note 22, at 333, 337-38. Hsia notes that creditors have
a variety of possible responses to this problem. One is to assume that all rejected ap-
plicants were noncreditworthy and treat them for estimation purposes as if they were bad
accounts. Hsia, supra note 23, at 394. Obviously this approach amplifies the negative
value of those traits that are characteristic of rejected applicants, some of whom would
not have shown bad performance. A second approach described by Hsia is to augment
derived scores by the probability that previously accepted applicants would receive that
score. Id. at 397-98. This would appear to perpetuate previous discriminatory rejection if
it assigned even greater positive value to attributes possessed in low proportion by
previously excluded women and minorities.
36. Defining "equal qualifications" is a central issue in discrimination law. This issue
has received sophisticated treatment in professional literature on scored predictive testing
in employment and education. The primary problem arises when the qualifying standards
are more accurately predictive of the ultimate performance of members of one demographic
group than of the performance of members of another demographic group. When tests
do not predict as accurately for one group as for another, an individual member likely to
succeed is less likely to be scored as a potential success than is a member of the group
for which the test predicts accurately. Fairness to the individual implies that it is dis-
criminatory to him, because of his group membership, to adhere strictly to the test
results in judging his likelihood of success. But adjusting test scores to admit more
potentially successful members of the group for which the test does not predict as ac-
curately also entails admitting more potential failures, who will, when opportunities are
limited, take an opportunity that could have been given to an individual for whom the
test predicted success more accurately. See, e.g., Cole, Bias in Selection, 10 J. Eouc. MEA-
SURFMENT 237 (1973) (discussing various proposed models of fairness and proposing
conditional probability model based on equal opportunity for potentially successful ap-
plicants); Thorndike, Concepts of Culture-Fairness, 8 J. Eouc. MEASVREMENT 63 (1971)
(alternative definition of fair test is test set to admit proportion of two groups reaching
specified level of criterion performance). The desirability of a given quantitative solution
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B. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments
The purpose of the ECOA was to eliminate discrimination in the
granting of consumer credit and to afford equal access to credit for
members of excluded groups.3- The drafters of the Act made a con-
scious decision to use the term "discriminate" 38 without defining or
qualifying it.39 They were concerned with more than just intentional
discrimination 40 and therefore chose to allow courts to assess the
subtleties of credit practices and their impact.41
The effects test was incorporated in the 1976 Amendments to the
ECOA in order to make it clear that the Act covered not only dis-
criminatory motivation but also the discriminatory effects of facially
neutral actions -.4 2 This action indicates a congressional intent that
for fair screening depends on the manner in which the two groups differ in relation to
the test. See Einhorn & Bass, Methodological Considerations Relevant to Discrimination
in Emnploymnent, 75 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 261 (1971) (differences between subgroups with
respect to test-criterion correlations, criterion means and variances, and differences in
standard errors of estimates are all relevant in avoiding unfair discrimination). Not
surprisingly, it has been argued that fairness in test selection cannot be reduced to com-
pletely mechanical procedures. Darlington, Another Look at "Cultural Fairness," 8 J.
EDUC. M.ASURE.MENT 71 (1971) (if conflict arises between two goals of maximizing test's
validity and minimizing test's discrimination against certain cultural groups, then sub-
jective, policy-level decision must be made concerning relative importance of two goals).
Discrimination law, using language eschewing quotas, has shown reluctance to embrace
strategies based on quantitative standards to avoid disparate outcomes. Any quantitative
approach, because it is necessarily based on group membership, does not respond to the
concern for individual rights that is the foundation of the law. The value placed on
individual autonomy, and the societal interest in rewarding individual achievement,
ground the legal preference for decisionmaking that is responsive to individual action. Cf.
Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235, 240-41 (1971) (racial
criterion unfair because race is not accurate predictor of productivity and is beyond in-
dividual control); Underwood, supia note 7, at 1434-42 (policies favoring individual auton-
omy as basis for evaluating use of statistical prediction).
37. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 3 ("[I]t must be established as clear national policy
that no credit applicant shall be denied the credit he or she needs and wants on the
basis of characteristics that have nothing to do with his or her creditworthiness.")
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976) ("It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant .... ")
39. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 25, at 402. The same decision was made with the
1976 Amendments. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 191 (statement of
Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Federal Reserve Board) (rejecting "arbitrary" as modifier to
discrimination).
40. 1974 Hearings, supra note 25, at 35 Passim (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger,
assistant attorney general) (to define proscribed discrimination with term "invidious"
would set ECOA apart from other civil rights statutes).
41. Id. (leaving general proscription unmodified would allow courts to apply concep-
tion of discrimination as it had developed in previous 10 years); id. at 32 (statement of
Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Federal Reserve Board) (courts can better evaluate certain
credit practices in specific contexts).
42. See note 4 supra; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 47-48 (statement of
Werner H. Kamarsky, commissioner, New York State Division of Human Rights) (em-
phasizing that discriminatory consequences, not just motivation, would be covered by
Act under effects test).
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the courts employ the same factfinding strategies in credit cases as
they do in Title VII employment cases. Congress clearly empowered
the courts43 to decide in each case whether a particular method of
credit decisionmaking affords an equal opportunity to any credit-
worthy individual. 44
The courts will encounter complicated legal and factual issues
when they apply the effects test to cases alleging discrimination based
on objective credit-scoring systems. When such objective measures
are used, it is difficult to distinguish between genuinely valid pre-
diction and inherent bias derived from the nature of the variables
measured and the scoring instrument. This problem was raised dur-
ing the congressional hearings concerning the 1976 Amendments.
Industry spokesmen contrasted credit scoring with subjective screen-
ing and argued that because a statistical device does not embody
subjective intent, it is necessarily unbiased. 45 They also produced
evidence that credit scoring aids prediction of aggregate credit per-
formance and improves the overall profitability of the creditor's port-
folio. 46 Some congressional subcommittee members and consumer
advocates, on the other hand, were seriously concerned that aggre-
gate measurement techniques "were inherently discriminatory in that
43. In addition, the Act empowers the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board to issue regulations that achieve this same purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976).
When it promulgated Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1978), the Board proscribed certain
facially neutral evaluative factors that are expected to have a disparate effect on protected
classes. See id. § 202.6(b)(4) (proscribing evaluation by creditor on basis of whether
telephone in applicant's own name); id. § 202.6(b)(5) (proscribing creditor discounting of
part-time income). However, the Board pointed out early in the hearings on the ECOA
that it could not be assumed that use of certain factors-for example, geographic regions-
necessarily discriminated against a protected class, and asserted that the discriminatory
nature of many factors could only be determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
See 1974 Hearings, supra note 25, at 32 (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Federal
Reserve Board).
44. Throughout the hearings leading to the Act and the 1976 Amendments, congres-
sional proponents stressed that the purpose of the ECOA was to provide equal access to
creditworthy persons based on individual willingness and ability to repay. At the same
time it was acknowledged that the purpose of the Act was not to require creditors to
extend credit to uncreditworthy individuals or to forego considering ability to collect in
the event of default. See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra note 25, at 15.
45. Testimony asserting the desirability of credit scoring invoked its objective quality
and likened it to actuarial prediction in casualty insurance. See id. at 61 Passim; 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 227 passim; Hearings Before Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 80
Passim (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]; but cf. id. at 37 (statement of
Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Federal Reserve Board) (contrasts between credit prediction
and death and casualty prediction indicate that credit scoring is less sophisticated and
less statistically reliable).
46. See, e.g., 1974 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 438-40; 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 45, at 87-95; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 440-45; Senate Report, supra
note 4, at 6.
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they saddl[e] each applicant with the statistical characteristics of
similar prior applicants." 47 The effects test responds to this concern,
but, without further specification, does not resolve the problem in
the credit-granting context: it remains for the courts to give con-
crete meaning to the ECOA standards for credit scoring.48
II. The Effects Test and Credit Scoring
The existing case law regarding the effects test is restricted almost
entirely to the area of employment discrimination prohibited by
Title VII. 49 It is natural to look to this case law for guidance in
applying the effects test to credit scoring. But these cases are rele-
vant only as analogies. Application of the test must be guided by
the nature of the underlying transaction and by the social goals per-
taining to that transaction. The factors that are salient in applying
the effects test are not the same for credit and employment decisions.
47. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6; see 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 455
(Sen. Biden) (expressing concern that people are "falling into a general category which is
used in the point scoring analysis when they really are an exception to that category, and
there is no way they can get out from under it").
48. Owing to the newness of the Act and the time required to bring a disparate impact
suit involving complicated statistical proof to trial, no ECOA suit challenging a credit-
scoring scheme on effects-test grounds has been fully tried. At least one case has raised an
effects-test issue. Carroll v. Exxon Co., 434 F. Supp. 557, 563 (E.D. La. 1977) (cannot con-
clude as matter of law that inquiry about number of dependents has effect of discriminat-
ing against unmarried persons). In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has pressed
two cases involving discriminatory-effects issues, along with other issues, to settlement.
United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 78-730 (S.D. Ohio, settlement filed Nox.
16, 1978); In re Aldens, Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,065 (FTC Feb. 14, 1978)
(consent order).
49. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The lower courts have applied a similar concept in public
employment cases litigated under the equal protection clause and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(1976). See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (police hiring); Arnold v.
Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (same). But see Harper v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1204 nA1 (D. Md. 1973) (fire department employment)
(cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 involve less stringent prohibition of nonintentional discrim-
ination than cases under Title VII because employer, upon showing business necessity, is
not further required to adopt less discriminatory alternative). However, this interpretation
was modified when the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
that the plaintiff must demonstrate discriminatory intent under the equal protection
clause. The holding's practical effect on public-employment cases was mitigated because
Title VII was extended to cover public employers in 1972. See Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-14 (1976)). Courts have in some instances applied an effects-test concept
to statutorily grounded housing discrimination cases. See generally Comment, Applying
the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128
(1976). Thus, the courts may be adopting a distinction between statutory discrimination
laws and the constitutional requirements of the equal protection clause.
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Nonetheless, the development of the effects test in employment
law provides a useful starting point for analysis of the test's appli-
cation to credit scoring. Close attention must be paid to the ways in
which credit scoring and employment screening resemble one an-
other, and to the ways in which they differ; only in this fashion will
it be possible to develop an application of the effects test to the
credit-scoring process that is responsive to the terms of the Act and
the goals of discrimination law.
A. The Effects Test in Employment Cases
The effects test under Title VII operates to shift the burdens of
producing evidence and of persuading the court. °0 The plaintiff has
the initial burden of proving the prima facie case that a facially
neutral procedure or standard has a disparate impact on a protected
class. If the adverse impact is shown, the defendant then has the
burden of persuading the court that this procedure or standard is
based on business necessity.5 ' Even if the defendant shows a legiti-
mate business purpose for the practices in question, the availability
of a less discriminatory52 means to achieve the same legitimate goals
may support a finding of discrimination.53
50. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (if individual establishes prima facie case of racial discrimination, burden shifts to
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employee's rejection).
51. Such presumptions are created to reflect judicial evaluation of probabilities and
a party's superior access to the proof, and to effectuate policies by creating a preferred
litigant. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 337, 343 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 61 (1961); cf. Underwood, Thumb
on the Scales of Justice, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977) (burdens of persuasion in criminal cases).
52. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (dictum) ("it remains
open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without
a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
'efficient and trustworthy workmanship'"; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (when practices perpetuate past discrimination, necessity
connotes irresistible demand; if safety and efficiency can be served by reasonably available
alternative system with less discriminatory effects, then present policies yielding disparate
effects cannot continue); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 & n.7 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (test is whether overriding business purpose for prac-
tice necessary to safe and efficient operation and no acceptable practices with lesser racial
impact exist).
53. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (alternative
holding) (refusal to hire anyone with criminal record discriminatory because insufficient
business necessity; individual consideration of significance of conviction is less restrictive
means); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974) (alterna-
tive ground) (availability of validated reading test as less restrictive means); United States
v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 309 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973)
(individual testing of abilities is nondiscriminatory alternative to seniority system for
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1. The Prima Facie Case
In the early effects-test cases in employment, the facially neutral
decision procedures were fairly obvious substitutes for previous, ex-
plicitly discriminatory practices.5 4 As the practices that were evalu-
ated became more subtle, the courts refined the standards of quan-
titative and qualitative proof of discrimination. The quantitative
method involves comparing the percentage of protected group mem-
bers among those hired after the effective date of the Act55 with the
percentage belonging to the group in the relevant population. The
relevant population can be defined as either the applicant pool 56 or
ensuring safety); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662-64 (2d Cir.
1971) (ground for remedy) (government proposed remedy as less restrictive means for
promotion system); Robinson v, Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (alternative ground) (availability of less discriminatory
alternative promotion system one factor in rejection of business necessity argument); B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 134-35 & n.15 (1976). See generally
Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative
Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974) (rejecting "business purpose," "no perpetuation," and
"balancing" tests for judicial response under Title VII to employment practices having
disparate impact; adopting "no alternative" theory that focuses on two questions: (1) Does
practice serve legitimate business purpose? (2) Is alternative practice available that will
promote business purpose equally well with lesser disparate impact on blacks?).
One commentary has speculated that the "no alternative" showing and the question
of which party has the burden of proving the availability of alternatives will be crucial
in applying the effects test to the credit context. See Geltzer 8- Feldman, An Initial
Analysis of the Impact of Revised Regulation B on the Retailer and Bank Creditor, 33
Bus. LAW. 115, 117 (1977). Although Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975), in dictum seems to suggest that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the
court that a less discriminatory alternative exists, some courts state that the defendant has
the burden of proving that no less discriminatory practices are available. Wallace v.
Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer must show no acceptable al-
ternative to garnishment policy); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F. Supp.
378, 383-84 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (alternative ground) (defendant did not show that there was
no less discriminatory alternative to physical agility test); see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1978)
(EEOC guidelines placing burden on employer to demonstrate that no suitable alterna-
tive with lesser impact available).
54. Eg., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (high school diploma require-
ment and employment tests that had disparate effect on departmental transfer rights
instituted where employer previously had maintained segregated departments); see Blum-
rosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MicH. L. Rv. 59, 59-66 (1972).
55. When the disparity is extreme, instead of limiting the comparison to post-Act
employment, the courts have compared the composition of the employer's entire work
force with the composition of the relevant population. See, e.g., International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-38 & n.17 (1977) (comparison of employer's
work force with general population appropriate when disparity great and employer's
post-Act hiring practices represent no significant change).
56. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (prima facie case primarily
shown by comparison of percentage of actual black applicants who passed test and actual
white applicants who passed test).
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the general population in the region' 57 or both.58 If the comparison
shows a statistically significant difference, a prima facie case has been
established.59 To ameliorate the stringency of this test as it was ini-
tially stated, the courts have recognized two refinements in the use
of statistical evidence. First, the universe for statistical comparison,
when based on general-population data, has been expressly limited
to qualified persons in the relevant geographic region. 60 Second, an
employer may defend against a prima facie showing by producing
evidence that the basis of comparison is skewed against him for
57. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 & n.13 (1977) (gen-
eral population of qualified teachers in St. Louis County is proper comparison for post-
Act hiring rate but defendant entitled to rebut statistics by showing that such population
comparison artificially inflated); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971)
(comparison of census statistics on percentages of blacks and whites in North Carolina
meeting high school diploma requirement and EEOC statistics on pass/fail rates on scored
tests by race sufficient to establish prima facie case).
58. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975).
59. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood,
the Supreme Court adopted the method of measuring statistical disparities set out in a
grand-jury discrimination case, Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 & n.17 (1977).
But see United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1978) (criticizing
adoption of jury-selection standard in Hazelwood on ground that applicants for employ-
ment are not randomly selected whereas jury venire seeks representative cross section of
community). With samples of reasonable size, if the difference between the expected value
and the observed value was greater than two or three standard deviations, then the
disparity would be a meaningful indicator that discrimination had occurred. 433 U.S. at
308 n.14. One commentator has noted that the binomial test applied in Castaneda and
Hazelwood is inappropriate when, as in employment testing or credit scoring, a dichoto-
mous population is subjected to a test creating a second dichotomy, i.e., passers and
failers. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof under
Title VII, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 793 (1978) (recommending statistical procedure known as
testing difference between independent proportions).
For pre-Hazelwood cases in which lower courts applied other approaches for evaluating
statistical information, see B. SCHLE[ & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 73 & nA5, 1185
n.173.
60. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 g& n.2 (1978) (implies proper
comparison for employment in skilled job in which performance error might create
extensive risks is between racial composition of employees and racial composition of
union membership in related skilled craft in region); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1977) (proper comparison for employment in job
requiring easily acquired skills is between racial composition of employees and racial
composition in regional population); cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974) (constitutional holding) (unlike case of jury service, in
which duty to serve falls equally on all citizens, general population statistics not appro.
priate when seats are restricted to highest ranking officers of designated city-wide orga-
nizations). Certain occupations entail complicated tasks that require highly sophisticated
training for which there is no readily available substitute. See Lerner, Washington v. Davis:
Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 263, 279-92. In
these situations, the courts have necessarily responded by acknowledging general training
or educational standards as valid screening factors. E.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 & n.13 (1977) (qualified public-school teachers). Under these
circumstances, the only option is to rely on improved availability of training opportunities
for minorities to lessen discriminatory impact.
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reasons that do not support an inference of discrimination.6 '
Although the courts have acknowledged that discrimination can
be established entirely on the basis of statistical proof, 2 most cases
couple statistical proof with nonstatistical evidence of discrimination.
Often statistics are "buttressed" with testimony regarding individual
instances of discrimination.6 3 The courts, however, have been most
impressed when the plaintiff has demonstrated that present proce-
dures perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Early transfer and
seniority cases under Title VII suggest that the courts found cur-
rently neutral procedures objectionable when they locked minorities
into disadvantaged positions resulting from previous discriminatory
treatment by the employer. 64 In hiring cases, the courts have simi-
61. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (remanding to
allow employer to rebut plaintiff's proof of disparity with statistics or other evidence);
Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employmcnt Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REv. 387 (1975); cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 579-80 (1978) (proof that employer's work force was racially balanced is not wholly
irrelevant on issue of motive).
62. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (district court
erred in requiring proof of actual discrimination in addition to statistical data implying
discrimination); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1348 (8th Cir. 1975)
(prima facie showing of discriminatory impact of employment tests may be established
by statistical data); Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences under
Title VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463, 464-66 (1973) (statistics in proof of prima facie case).
63. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-06 (1977); In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977); Note, suPra note
62, at 472 (many courts require that defendants prove at least one specific instance of
discrimination in order to prevail).
64. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). When transfer or seniority arrangements have locked minorities
into less desirable jobs, courts have held that the employer must meet a high standard to
prove the business necessity of the practice. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (necessity connotes irresistible demand); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (over-
riding legitimate business purpose required). The Supreme Court has, however, been
reluctant to impose a full-scale reorganization of transfer and seniority rights, even when
past discrimination is being perpetuated, because of the implications for the expectation
interests of incumbent workers. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 353 (1977). Teamsters relied on § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976), which provides that it is not unlawful for an employer to apply "different stan-
dards ... pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system ... provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate," 431 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added). In
keeping with the concerns expressed in Teamsters, the Court has limited litigant's access
to remedies for the effects of transfer and seniority policies. See United Air Lines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (seniority system giving present effect to past discrimination
must be linked to present violation; plaintiff's failure to file timely charge regarding
discriminatory termination that severed her seniority rights precludes successful challenge
to seniority system); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (effects of dis-
criminatory refusal to hire combined with seniority system that perpetuates disadvantage
justifies award of seniority relief, but only to individual class members for whom em-
ployer cannot successfully show that refusal to hire was nondiscriminatory). The limita-
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larly looked to the employer's decisionmaking procedures and their
past effects, and examined whether the employer has made any sig-
nificant change that could reasonably be expected to avoid the ef-
fects of past practices. '!- A finding of present discrimination may be
avoided by the employer, however, if the previous practices have
been altered and, as a result, the employer can adduce statistics dem-
onstrating no observable disparate effects arising from present prac-
tices.00 Regardless of the lack of aggregate impact, the plaintiff may
attempt to prove disparate treatment by showing that screening pro-
cedures were discriminatorily applied to each individual. 7
The prima facie showing of disparate impact has been used by the
courts in the employment context to evaluate different kinds of
decisionmaking processes. In cases of unstructured subjective screen-
ing involving ambiguous and undisclosed standards and possibly
biased individual judgments, the courts have emphasized the past
and present results of the process, the extent of the disparate results,
and the employer's lack of effort to improve procedures. 8 When
objective measures are challenged, the courts can more easily evalu-
ate the standards used, in isolation from the overall results of the
procedures.0 9 The courts have emphasized the relationship between
tions imposed on actions challenging seniority systems do not alter the general principle
that an inference of discrimination is supported by evidence that a shift to facially neutral
practices does not represent a significant change from past practices that had exclusionary
effect. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-43 (1977).
65. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301-04 (1977) (unstructured
screening process with historic discriminatory effect and efforts to recruit teachers only at
predominantly white educational institutions continued unmodified by employer).
66. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 571-72 (1978) (case on disparate-
impact theory avoided by employer with statistics demonstrating that labor-force parity
was achieved by affirmative recruitment voluntarily instituted). An employer cannot,
however, by altering his present practices, erase his liability for past acts of discrimina-
tion. Cf. id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("employer cannot be relieved of responsibility
for past discriminatory practices merely by undertaking affirmative action").
67. See id. at 579 ("A racially balanced workforce cannot immunize an employer from
liability for specific acts of discrimination."); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (developing distinction between disparate treatment
of individual and disparate impact on class of individuals); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972) (complainant establishes individual prima facie case by
showing (i) individual belongs to racial minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for
job for which employer was seeking applicants; (iii) he was rejected; and (iv) position
remained open).
68. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570 (1978) (deliberate
effort by employer to identify and recruit qualified blacks); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 301-04 (1977) (failure to improve unstructured hiring stan-
(lards and procedures and failure to recruit at minority colleges, although actively recruit-
ing at predominantly white institutions).
69. The problems inherent in evaluating standards separately from their overall result
were particularly salient in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (applying equal
protection clause) (verbal-ability test used to screen job applicants). In Washington v.
Davis, plaintiffs produced evidence that the verbal-ability test used as a hiring standard
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these standards and the tasks to be performed, and have disallowed
broad standards that would automatically exclude minorities when
a more particularized standard might not.7 0 Because it is often dif-
ficult to assess the relationship of scored tests to the tasks for which
they screen, regulatory agencies have set out methodological guide-
lines for the fair use of such tests7 ' and the courts have relied on
these standards.72
2. Business Necessity
If a prima facie case is made by the plaintiff, the defendant may
still rebut it by showing that the practice or standard is necessary
for police officers led to rejection of blacks over whites at a four-to-one rate. They at-
tempted to prove that the relationship between the verbal-test score and job performance
was not established. Defendants, however, had demonstrated a vigorous program of black
recruitment and produced undisputed evidence that the result of the hiring process was
substantially similar to population percentages in the region. Further, defendants showed
that success on the verbal-ability test correlated with success in training school. One
commentator argued that the disparate rejection rate for minorities in Washington v.
Davis was a concomitant of the vigorous recruitment of black applicants and that a
fairer standard for evaluating the test and screening procedure, at least for complex jobs,
would be comparison of percentages of rejections in a qualified pool in the region, rather
than comparison with an applicant pool. See Lerner, supra note 60, at 269-79. The
Supreme Court appears implicitly to have acknowledged this reasoning. See p. 1464 supra.
A policy of encouraging good-faith recruitment efforts would seem to support application
of the Washington v. Davis approach in statutory cases as well.
Still, one can imagine a circumstance under which recruitment practices would not
adequately explain the disparate rejection rate: an employer, although seeking majority
applicants of average qualification, might recruit only highly qualified minorities to
achieve general population parity and employ a screening device that was not well related
to job needs and was highly discriminatory against minorities generally. Cf. Note, supra
note 62, at 470 (unless validated as job-related, general intelligence test standard accepting
whites at 10-times rate of blacks, in region where 10% of population is black, is discrimina-
tory, if 50% of available union members are black).
70. Rejecting the employer's use of high school diploma requirements and objective
scored tests in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court highlighted the
goal of ensuring that screening standards allow individuals an equal opportunity to show
job-worthiness. The objectionable features of the employer's standards were threefold.
They were overbroad and general. Id. at 433. Because they included attributes that
minorities had not had an equal opportunity to attain, the standards tended to "freeze"
minorities into lower-paying positions. Id. at 430. Moreover, the standards did not allow
the basic intelligence of a minority-group member "the means of articulation to manifest
itself fairly." Id.
71. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (1978) (guidelines to employers to determine whether tests are
in compliance); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1978) (similar guidelines for government contractors). The
American Psychological Association has issued guidelines concerned with such test develop-
ment. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TrSrs AND MANUALS (1966) (general standards and guidelines for evaluative
information to be provided by professional test developers to user); DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL-
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AssOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE
VALIDATION AND USE OF PERSONNEL SELECTION PROCEDURES (1975), reprinted in B. SCHLEt &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 1395-1412 (guidelines for testing practitioners).
72. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-36 (1975); Watkins v.
Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1187-94 (5th Cir. 1976).
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for a legitimate business purpose. The business necessity concept re-
mains vague and necessarily tied to the underlying facts, but some
general principles can be delineated. The courts have long acknowl-
edged that the defendant has a legitimate interest in hiring and pro-
moting employees who can perform the particular tasks required.
However, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,73 the Supreme Court held
that a standard allegedly designed to improve the overall quality of
the work force 74 was unacceptable because it did not have a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question." 75 It emphasized that
the social preference embodied in discrimination law is for standards
and screening procedures that allow individuals, regardless of group
membership, an opportunity to demonstrate job-worthiness.76 Rec-
ognizing that use of individual screening or validated tests to evalu-
ate job capabilities may be more costly than broad standard require-
ments or unvalidated tests, the courts have indicated, nonetheless,
that the legitimate desire for inexpensive and rapid evaluation pro-
cedures and standards does not constitute a business necessity defense
for a test or standard that is not adequately job-related.77
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. The Court took as probative the fact that "employees who have not completed
high school or taken the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily and make progress
in departments for which the high school and test criteria are now used." Id. at 431-32.
In rejecting the employer's justification in Griggs, the Court equated business purpose
with job-relatedness. For a discussion of the conflict between a broad business purpose
standard and a job-relatedness standard in the lower courts prior to Griggs, see Develop-
ments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. Rxv. 1109, 1132-39 (1971).
75. 401 U.S. at 432. The Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975),
amplified these concerns when it addressed standards similar to those in Griggs, but
supported by somewhat more sophisticated validation. The Court found objectionable
the fact that the employer relied on general-ability tests without relating the measures to
particular attributes or skills needed in various job groupings. The validation was also
weak because it correlated scored tests with job performance as measured only by gen-
eral supervisory rankings that were based on job groups near the top of lines of pro-
gression. Finally, the validation study was based on the performance of white workers
only. Id. at 431-35.
76. See note 70 supra.
77. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 427-36, 428 n.24 (1975)
(general-ability tests rejected because they tested broader range of skills than job require-
ments justified and local validation of tests was inadequate); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (industry practice,
efficiency of promoting those with most experience to maintain employee morale, and
avoidance of union strikes over contract provisions, although related to business costs, do
not show business necessity justifying discriminatory departmental seniority system). The
Robinson court noted: "While considerations of economy and efficiency will often be
relevant to determining the existence of business necessity, dollar cost alone is not de-
terminative. For example, although there undoubtedly are significant costs involved in
validating tests, Griggs requires that employment tests be abandoned if not specifically
validated as job-related." Id. at 799 n.8; see Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-
96 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (garnishment of employee's wages as basis for discharge) ("only
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In considering business necessity justifications, the courts have
shown more concern about threats to life than about threats to
profits. In early seniority and transfer cases involving racial discrimi-
nation, business necessity was defined as a practice that is necessary
for the "safe and efficient" operation of the business.78 A similar
requirement evolved as the basis of the defense that sex was a "bona
fide occupational qualification." 79 When efficiency is at issue, the
courts have generally scrutinized alleged business necessity defenses
closely. In contrast, a threat to the safety and well-being of others
has justified the use of standards that are exceptionally broad or
are applied in a nonparticularized way.80
Two questions regarding the standard for business necessity re-
main open. The first is the extent to which an enterprise must par-
ticularize and validate its measures according to specific performance
categories. The second and more important question is when effi-
ciency or cost concerns are legitimate defenses.81
permissible reason for tolerating discrimination is 'business necessity' which is 'related to
job performance' "). But see Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.
L. RFv. 844, 850-51 (1972) (criticizing Johnson); 85 HARV. L. Rav. 1482, 1485-86 (1972)
(same).
78. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
79. Proof that sex, national origin, or religion is a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" is a defense under Title VII for the consideration of these characteristics in an
employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976); see, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 422 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) ("business necessity"
not "business convenience" test; discrimination on basis of sex valid only when essence of
business operation would be undermined by not hiring one sex exclusively); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969) (to rely on bona fide
occupational qualification exception, employer has burden of proving that all or sub-
stantially all women cannot perform safely and efficiently).
80. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-36 (1977) (bona fide occupational
qualification grounds) (essence of correctional counselor's job is to maintain prison
security; at least under conditions in instant case, presence of woman would pose real
threat to security); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972) (disparate
impact grounds) ("When the job clearly requires a high degree of skill and the economic
and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer
bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are job-
related.")
81. Cost concerns have received some deference from the Court in the recent pregnancy-
benefits cases. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (although employer may
not suspend seniority rights for women taking pregnancy leave, he could refuse to grant
disability pay at least when no showing that men receive more benefits than women);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-39 (1976) (employer's plan excluding
pregnancy benefits not sex discrimination per se because it included no risk from which
only one sex protected; no disparate impact when pregnancy benefits costly and benefits
package lacking pregnancy benefits was not worth more to men than to women). It
should be noted that these cases have been legislatively amended. Act of Oct. 31, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)) (adding § 701(k) of
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B. The Analogy Between Credit Screening and Employment
1. Similarities
The granting of credit is similar to hiring in several ways. Both
decisions involve assessments of risk.82 The primary problem for the
screening party in each case is minimizing the risk of bad perfor-
mance and loss associated with a relationship yet to be created. The
problem for the individual applicant is signaling his qualifications
to the screening party.83
Similarly, the use of statistical screening devices in credit granting
resembles the hiring process. The devices serve the same basic pur-
poses in both areas: they are intended to increase the screener's pre-
dictive power while avoiding the expense of making individualized
determinations. They also create the same types of dangers in both
areas. As has already been discussed, 4 a statistical device can dis-
criminate explicitly, by using overbroad or exclusive measures, or
implicitly, by being based on prior exclusionary practices or by in-
corporating stereotyped or otherwise inaccurate group characteriza-
tions. As a result, the devices can underpredict or mispredict for
protected classes.
The similarity between credit granting and employment suggests
Title VII to clarify that denial of pregnancy-related benefits constitutes sex discrimina-
tion).
Sex-related cost differences did not justify discrimination in Los Angeles Water &
Power Dep't v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), in which the Court concluded that the Title
VII requirement of sex-neutral treatment forbids assessing pension plan contributions on
the basis of a sex-differentiated mortality table. It rejected the argument that differential
treatment was excused by a "difference in the cost of providing pension benefits," and
stated simply that Title VII does not contain a "cost-justification defense." Id. at 716.
The Court did, however, conclude that difficult conceptual problems of fairness, and
social policy considerations associated with benefits estimation precluded awarding back
pay to females who had previously contributed to the plan at a higher rate than males.
Id. at 719-23. In so doing, the Court seemed to be taking account of both cost considera-
tions and the egregiousness of the wrongdoing at issue.
82. See A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING (1974) (information transfer and its economic
implications in hiring and related screening processes).
83. The relationship between the screening party and the applicant, although recipro-
cal, is not symmetrical. The screening party has a long-term interest in the signaling
exchange and can choose signals to suit himself. In contrast, the applicant may have
little power, in the short run, to make a favorable showing. Id. at 74-75 (in credit market,
many potential signals (arguably alterable characteristics) turn into effective indices (un-
alterable characteristics) as costs of altering characteristics exceed gains for individual
applicant). Furthermore, it is unlikely that the individual applicant has the time, resources,
or interest to obtain an understanding of the signals used or to develop a full repertoire
of meaningful signals. Id. at 107 (relatively large number of people in market at one time
and relative infrequency with which one individual appears in market conspire to elimi-
nate investment in signaling by primary signalers).
84. See pp. 1455-58 suPra.
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that the basic outlines of the effects test as applied to employment
can also be applied to credit granting. In both cases, a statistically
significant difference in acceptance rates may be taken to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of remedying this
situation is correctly placed on the screener because he alone possesses
the means to reorganize screening and provide equal access.8 5 Especially
when the screener looks to attributes that the individual applicant can-
not control, or that are often not directly related to actual individual
performance, the burden of changing the screening device should be
placed on the screening party.80 In these respects, the creditor may
differ from the employer because the creditor more frequently relies
on such unalterable attributes. Therefore, the burden of remedying
the screening defects should fall more heavily on the creditor than
on the employer.
There is a final similarity between the granting of credit and
employment. Both are socially valued activities. The practical need
to judge people according to their work skill or their creditworthiness
must not be forgotten as the law attempts to remedy discrimination.
The social goals associated with credit and employment are impor-
tant to the public at large and they are shared by groups protected
by the ECOA. Employment and credit opportunities are made possi-
ble by business health and prosperity. Little would be gained by
society if courts required access for those who were not qualified.
Thus, a business necessity defense in both areas makes sense, despite
the shortrun disadvantages imposed on protected classes.
2. Differences Between Credit Screening and Employment
In framing the judicial test for discrimination in the credit con-
text, it is also important to note some differences between credit
screening and similar screening in the employment context. Credit
85. Cf. G. CALABREsi, THE COSTS or ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970) (allocation of risk in tort
law). In addition to being the primary party with the means to recognize screening, the
creditor may be the most efficient means of distributing the costs of eliminating dis-
crimination. The cost of reorganizing credit screening can be distributed onto society as
a whole through other avenues as well. For example, government programs offer direct
loans and credit insurance to remove or mitigate imperfections that keep the lending
market from delivering funds to equal risks at equal cost and to encourage economic
transactions, such as home ownership and education, that benefit society as well as the
purchaser. D. LARKINS, 3300 BILLION IN LOANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL CREDIT
PROcRAres 4-5 (1972). However, because the screening party has a long-term interest in the
screening process, and the capacity to determine which signals to recognize, see generally,
A. SPENCE, supra note 82, the screening party is a readily available avenue of redistribution
and has incentive to find the most efficient procedures that meet standards of fairness.
86. See note 83 supra; pp. 1472-73 infra.
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scoring may have more objectionable features than employment test-
ing. In addition, the use of objective predictors in the screening process
is relatively more important for credit granting than for employment.
First, problems in the credit area are not as susceptible to easy
quantitative solutions. Creditors are not allowed, under the Act, to
validate the impact of a credit-scoring scheme by separating credit
recipients according to membership in protected groups8T In addi-
tion, it is much more difficult to particularize the criteria tested in
the credit context than in hiring because of the broad group char-
acteristics necessarily used in the actuarial-like prediction of credit
scoring 8 and because there seem to be many kinds of personal at-
tributes that are relevant to creditworthiness.8 9 Thus there is a need
87. Regulation B and regulatory agencies generally forbid creditors to collect informa-
tion on individual applicants that would allow them to assess the differential validity of
the scoring instrument on the creditor's own pool. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1978). But see id.
§ 202.13 (creditor who receives consumer applications for purchase of residential real
property shall request information regarding protected status for monitoring purposes).
Some regulators and consumer advocates opposed proposals to allow creditors to inquire
about protected group membership because, they assert, such inquiries would facilitate
willful discrimination and make the task of proving such discrimination more difficult.
88. Although credit scoring resembles actuarial prediction in that it employs broad
groups to predict risk, credit scoring differs as a practical matter in at least two important
respects. First, credit scoring is used to predict an event-nonpayment-that is likely to
occur with only a small subset of borrowers whereas actuarial prediction for life insurance
and annuities predicts the timing of an event-death-that occurs with certainty. Second,
credit scoring is almost always based on a creditor's own sample of past borrowers, while
actuarial prediction is often based on industry-wide data. These differences, along with
others, mean that credit scoring is generally less sophisticated and less statistically reliable
than actuarial prediction for insurance purposes. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note
45, at 37 (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Federal Reserve Board).
89. See pp. 1453-54 supra. Typically a job applicant is screened primarily for relevant
job skills. Employment tests and other standards are devised to measure in some rough
manner the extent of such skills possessed by the individual applicant. By contrast, credit
scoring does not attempt to assess the level of individual achievement or performance
history but only to assess whatever small probability of nonpayment exists on the basis of
broad group categories. Credit payment performance could be and is used by some
creditors as a screening device and good payment history, once established, may be the
best predictor that the individual will show future good payment. Cf. STANFORD RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 98 (analysis suggests that, even for quite new accounts,
customer's record of charging and payments is of so much importance as to almost en-
tirely outweigh value of data contained in original application). However, the costs and
time required in obtaining credit reports, and various shortcomings of credit reporting
practices, have discouraged some creditors from placing primary reliance on credit reports
for new customer screening. Further, credit history standards disadvantage women and
minorities who have been excluded from receipt of credit. See note 103 infra. Screening
with tests that assess individual attitudes based on a behavioral model has been
proposed. See Grablowsky, Behavioral Model of Risk in Consumer Credit, 30 J. FINANCE
915 (1975). But this approach has been considered impractical because fraud is easier with
such a screening device than with prediction devices keyed to independently verifiable in-
formation. See B. Shinkel, Effects of Limiting Information in the Granting of Consumer
Credit 41-42 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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for different and more creative judicial and administrative solutions
in the credit context.
A related difference is that creditors rely more often than do em-
ployers on predictive variables that individuals cannot or typically
will not change for the purpose of getting credit.90 Although this
problem is present to some extent in employment testing, the recent
efforts to relate measures to particular tasks have made it easier for
protected groups to perform favorably on scored tests.91 Efforts to
improve the availability of education and training represent an ad-
ditional mitigating factor'.9 2 The nature of credit prediction gener-
ally suggests that it is unreasonable to rely on similar avenues to
improve credit access for creditworthy members of protected classes,
and that the bulk of the accessibility problems must be confronted
by altering the organization and standards of screening itself.93 Con-
sequently, creditors should have a greater responsibility than em-
ployers to discover and overcome the differential effect that their
chosen measures have on creditworthy members of protected classes.
A second major difference between the use of scored tests in em-
ployment and credit screening lies in the relative importance of
risk prediction to the success of the enterprises involved. The em-
ployer's ability to identify all the job applicants who represent the
best risk has only a limited relationship to profitmaking. His desire
and capacity to hire new employees are only partially dependent on
his ability to locate potential good employees. Although discrimina-
tion laws may force an employer to search out new sources of able
employees among protected classes, these laws cannot, by doing so,
significantly increase an employer's profits or expand the total num-
ber of jobs available.
Creditors have a greater interest in developing effective predictive-
screening devices because credit screening is an aspect of marketing
and sales. The number of credit applicants that a creditor may ac-
90. See p. 1454 supLra. In order to decrease information cost and achieve reliability of
prediction, creditors prefer to use characteristics that individuals cannot alter or generally
do not change to acquire credit. Cf. A. SPENCE, supra note 82, at 74 (costs to individual
applicants of altering signals exceed gains); B. Shinkel, supra note 89, at 41-42 (risks of
"gaming" with credit-screening devices employing information easily altered or not
readily verified by creditor).
91. See p. 1468 supra.
92. During the last decade, one alternative to requiring employers to hire untrained
or relatively less skilled employees to overcome the effects of past exclusion has been to
provide job-training programs for disadvantaged groups. See C. BELL, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE GiErro 174-93 (1970). Although the costs of such an approach may have been great,
the strategy is in keeping with the general societal value placed on training and
experience.
93. See p. 1471 & note 83 supra.
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cept is a function of expected risk, costs, and the number of credit-
worthy persons willing to purchase credit from that creditor. The
creditor seeks to improve the predictive accuracy of his screening in
order to increase his ability to borrow or resell his consumer port-
folio to the secondary lending community.94 Further, unlike an em-
ployer, the creditor himself will undoubtedly benefit from expanding
his applicant pool. A creditor who can identify previously excluded
individuals who in fact are good credit risks can expand his opera-
tions and his profitabilityya Therefore, requiring creditors to alter
screening practices to identify new good risks is less burdensome, in
the long run, than requiring employers to make comparable alterations.
III. A Proposed Standard for the Effects Test
in Credit Screening
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the effects test, it is pos-
sible to propose a standard for credit scoring that deals with the
conflict between equality and predictive convenience. To fulfill the
goal of equal opportunity, screening must allow individuals who
would perform equally well an equal chance to signal their expected
performance."0 Thus, the effects test should be applied in a manner
analogous to its application in the employment context. Because the
creditor himself would benefit from the increased applicant pool
that would emerge under a restructured screening device, this stan-
dard should be more stringent. In cases in which the standard is
not met, creditors should be required to take affirmative steps to
implement screening techniques that improve accessibility for mi-
norities and women.
Existing discrimination law is notably unspecific about an "affirma-
tive steps" requirement because it entails a case-by-case balancing of
competing interestsOr In the credit-scoring context, however, the pri-
94. See generally STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 97-98 (risk char-
acteristics of customers affect not only loss and collection expense but also cost of funds).
95. See Hsia, supra note 23, at 420. One industry representative testifying before the
Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs noted:
[Cjredit is inclusionary by its nature. It is different from employment or schools where
the number of jobs or classroom seats is limited, and an action to prefer one applicant
will necessarily work to disadvantage another. Most retailers have no set limits on the
number of credit accounts or cards to be issued.
1975 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 432 (Richard E. Cremer, Montgomery Ward).
96. See note 36 supra. See generally A. SPENCE, supra note 82, at 14-46 (modeling
rational effect on economic opportunities sought by two demographic groups in screening
situations).
97. Compare Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971) (contractors bidding for federal contracts must submit affirmative-
action plans) with Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
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mary emphasis should be on preventing discrimination because the
overall benefits of removing discrimination outweigh countervailing
concerns. Fairness to creditors does not require leniency, but it does
require advance notice of the standard that they must meet.
A. The Prima Facie Case
The standard for proof of the prima facie case should implement
equal-access goals while enabling the creditor to know what screen-
ing practices may be discriminatory. Formulation of such a standard
involves two major determinations-how the relevant population for
comparative analysis will be defined, and how stringent the require-
ments of equality will be.
In discrimination law the accepted universe of comparison is the
applicant pool or qualified population in the relevant geographic
region.9 For credit discrimination, the qualified population should
include all persons who fall within the general range of a reasonable
minimum income and do not have incomes exceeding a certain maxi-
mum associated with the lender's risk level. Minimum income can,
in turn, be defined by the amount of income necessary to meet the
usual obligation to the creditor.99 In determining this minimum, the
1977), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 608 (1978) (No. 78-435) (voluntary affirmative job-training
quota for racial minorities impermissible when quota not instituted to correct past
discriminatory practices). Note that Title VII includes an "antipreferential" provision,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976); except insofar as provided by the general requirement not
to discriminate, the ECOA contains no similar provisions. Although H.R. 6516, one of
proposed amendments in 1976, contained a provision, § 703(b), which stated that failure of
a creditor to achieve minority representation proportional to the general population was
not a per se violation of the Act, H.R. 6516, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1976). That provision
was omitted in the enacted amendment.
98. See pp. 1463-64 supra. The relevant geographic region has never been reduced to
a uniform standard. When dealing with pass-fail comparisons, the courts have considered
the geographic area from which applicants are likely to come. For general population-
work-force comparisons, the courts have applied a more restrictive standard. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 1178-81. The geographic scope of comparison
must similarly be determined on a case-by-case basis for creditors.
However, because minorities in urban areas tend to live in predominantly minority
residential neighborhoods, see M. DANIELSON, sutra note 31, at 10-11, and higher rejection
rates for minority credit applicants are observed even within income and asset categories,
see 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 461-62 (statement of Steven M. Rohde);
COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, supra note 33, minorities have been forced to pay more for
goods, D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 49-93 (1967), and credit, id. at 94-104. Thus, a
minority neighborhood should not be excluded from the scope of comparison be-
cause inhabitants of those neighborhoods have relatively low incomes or do not show a
high rate of trade with the creditor.
99. The creditor's primary concern, ability to repay, would generally be met by the
income standard. Persons who met this standard would also be likely to have assets or
possessions that could be recovered in the event of default. But see note 102 infra.
Anal)ing the creditor's past income standards and the general income range of the
individuals in his credit pool serves two functions. First, when the availability of a
sizeable down payment is a factor in the loan, the creditor's experience suggests an income
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cost of living in the region and the creditor's experience with income
levels that have high default rates is relevant. The income range
represented in a creditor's historical pool of debtors would also be
probative of fair criteria for the population of comparison, especially
if the creditor has not recently raised the floor.'00
As an aggregate measure, the income-range test meets the general
statutory standard of willingness and ability to repay.1 1 This same
standard provides a fair percentage of the population for compari-
son in the judicial test; 102 it is neither unreasonable to the creditor
range of individuals who have met the standard. Second, such an analysis accounts for
industry price stratification. See note 18 supra. Industry stratification implies that each
creditor deals primarily with a population composed of individuals within a given in-
come range. Because most protected classes constitute a higher proportion of low-income
populations than they constitute of the general population, the courts should employ an
income ceiling as well as an income floor in applying the effects test, at least for some
creditors. Otherwise, the judicial test will protect creditors at the upper end of the income-
risk continuum and will be lax with creditors at the lower end, where most protected
classes are overrepresented compared to their proportion in the general population. Cf.
Note, 1976 Amndments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 633, 647
(1976) (unless "adverse action" provisions of ECOA applied in manner that takes account
of risk-reflective interest rates, availability of credit from creditors who do adjust credit
terms to lend to broad range of population will be restricted).
100. If the rise in minimum income were in keeping with the rate of inflation, this
could easily be demonstrated at trial. However, significant changes made soon after the
passage of the Act or its amendments would support an inference of discrimination.
Under the effects test, the creditor would have the burden of proving that the change
had a bona fide purpose if the change contributed to a statistically significant disparity.
101. See note 44 supra.
102. The ability to pay reflected in income is, of course, mediated by an individual's
savings rate. The Act disfavors an assumption that members of one group will have
higher obligations or lower savings rates than those of another; however, there may be
cases in which this is true. For example, members of one group, for reasons of cultural
preference, may tend to have more dependents, and therefore lower economic capability
at a given income level. Of course, the creditor is prohibited from using group member-
ship to predict this relationship; he may, however, use number of dependents as a
predictor of payment. The effects test allows creditor screening by multifactor credit
scoring to defeat the prima facie case upon a showing that: (a) the number of depen-
dents is, in fact, related to payment behavior for both groups and (b) the disparate
impact of the scoring device that contains several variables can be substantially explained
by this variable. See Note, supra note 61. In contrast, a defendant need not make the
second showing when the criterion relied on is a unitary pass-fail device and the per-
missibility of any component factor is not an issue.
The creditor who had previously excluded one group would have difficulty demon-
strating statistically that the number of dependents related to payment behavior for the
group. This demonstration is important because the effect of the number of dependents
on credit payment ability is probably greater at the low end of the income continuum
than at the high end. If the group with whom number of dependents was derived as
a predictive variable tended to have more dependents among its lower-income members
while the new group tended to have more dependents at the upper-income level, a
low score for high number of dependents might be overburdensome for the new group.
The court might look to other evidence in order to determine whether the relationship
of number of dependents to other factors, such as income, in the two groups is similar




nor so lax that it merely reflects past discriminatory practices. 03 An
income-based comparison pool for the effects test would not, of course,
imply that a creditor must grant credit on the basis of income. 04
He may find that other variables are better predictors of repayment
for him. The income criterion is merely used to alert the court
to instances when a creditor may have failed to take sufficient steps
to mitigate the exclusionary effects of traditional credit-screening
practices.
Some commentators have suggested limiting the comparison popu-
lation to the applicant pool.' 0 5 But such a rule would not force
creditors to take affirmative steps' 00 to improve the access afforded
103. Financial and credit-reference measures should not be standards for inclusion
because they build in the effects of past exclusionary practices of the credit and financial
industry. Even as a basis for exclusion, credit references have a number of pitfalls. First,
many women and minorities have never received credit and consequently do not have
a credit history. See Letter from Lewis H. Goldfarb, assistant director, Sally Gold and
Rena Steinzor, attorneys, Division of Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Federal Trade Commission to Theodore E. Allison, secretary, Federal Reserve Board
(July 28, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as FTC Letter]. Second,
creditors who lend to the lower socioeconomic groups tend to employ more stringent
monitoring and credit-reporting techniques so that it is likely that such groups will
accumulate a history of late payment. Cf. STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21,
at 98 (extension of credit is often not only end in itself but also means to build up
proven customers; in general only consumer-finance companies provide "saturation level"
collection effort). The court should be cautious in either anchoring proof of discrimi-
nation or fashioning remedial plans on the basis of late payment history because such
screening may be an artifact of creditor-reporting patterns that vary according to the
social class of a creditor's usual customers.
104. Research on payment prediction suggests that once a threshold level of income
is met, income does not operate to predict bad payment. See, e.g., D. DURAND, supra note
22, at 4-5, 45-48 (none of income distributions of borrowers from creditors including com-
mercial banks, retail merchants, and finance companies show more than moderate ten-
dency for higher incomes to be better risks). Explanations for this phenomenon may be
that stability of income, the margin beween income and expenses available to repay
indebtedness, and the character and financial awareness of the credit user are more im-
portant than his absolute amount of income given a minimum capacity. Id. at 5.
105. See Hsia, supra note 23, at 421 (arguing that applicant pool comparison is pref-
erable alternative because it fits creditor's unique market). The applicant pool, moreover,
is a readily available alternative because Regulation B requires the creditor to retain
records on applications and actions taken for 25 months after the applicant receives
notification from the creditor. 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(2) (1978). But cf. Note, supra note 62,
at 469-72 (illustrating various conditions under which comparative (pass-fail) and demo-
graphic (general population) statistics might be beneficially used in evaluating employ-
ment discrimination).
106. In fact, use of the applicant pool might discourage affirmative recruitment. Cf.
Lerner, supra note 60, at 272. Furthermore, a creditor who did not have significant ex-
perience with protected classes might avoid these groups in order to avoid consideration
of new kinds of applicants for which his past sample was not an adequate representative.
Cf. D. DURAND, supra note 22, at 7 (concern in credit prediction that scoring necessarily
derives from sample of past credit users); Eisenbeis, supra note 25 (problems of measure-
ment in credit prediction include sample bias); FTC Letter, supra note 103 (discussing
creditor's techniques for avoiding dealing with general population). Because of the
stratification of the market, see note 18 supra, the court may want to consider both
the applicant pool and the relevant population in the region to assess the fairness of
the creditor's standards and procedures.
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by screening. In addition, applicant-pool comparison is less likely to
alert courts that creditors are avoiding or discouraging applications
from certain subpopulations. 07 Although such avoidance or discour-
agement might be treated as another form of discrimination," 8 proof
problems might be insurmountable. Prescreening and solicitation tech-
niques are not easily detectable by private parties unfamiliar with
credit practices.' 0
Once the relevant population has been defined, the final question
concerns the degree of stringency appropriate in applying the non-
discrimination requirement. The nature of consumer credit and the
types of measurement used both suggest the adoption of demanding
requirements. A significant statistical difference in credit access be-
tween qualified members of a protected class and members of the
majority group should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Creditors will argue that such a standard is overburdensome and,
107. Cf. FTC Letter, sukra note 103. In this letter, the staff of the FTC recommended
to the Federal Reserve Board that Regulation B be amended to define "credit transac-
tion" to include direct mail or telephone solicitation of prospective applicants since
many creditors use criteria and procedures to select prescreened lists that have the
"effect of excluding a disproportionate share of women and minorities within the mar-
ket area." Id. The Commission noted that lists are often screened by zip code to isolate
individuals with desirable demographic characteristics. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE PRIVAcY
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 136-37
(1977)). The FTC Letter also discussed a letter from a national retail-credit bureau to
a large national credit-card issuer that outlined the criteria used for a prescreened
solicitation. The criteria included:
1. Minimum file history of two years. 2. Minimum of three satisfactory trade items
rated open/paid satisfactory from the following subscriber industries: bank, bank
credit card, retail credit card, sales finance, credit union, savings and loan, service
and professional. 3. Maximum of three inquiries within six months. 4. Absence of
any trade item from the loan finance industry. 5. Absence of any Special Comments
or Manager Attention transactions.
FTC Letter, supra note 103. The FTC recited the manner in which each criterion oper-
ates to exclude on prohibited bases. Id.
108. See Note, supra note 8, at 910-11 (suggesting that proof of employer practices
discouraging certain groups from taking test should be basis for prima facie case of
discrimination).
Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1978), specifically prohibits the creditor from
making any oral or written statement that would discourage members of protected
classes from applying. It does not, however, proscribe as discriminatory a general solici-
tation strategy that simply avoids protected classes.
109. The possibility that the creditor will solicit using mailing lists, with unidentified
demographic characteristics, from an independent source or apply his own evaluative
standards only after they have been filtered through another source, see note 107 supra,
poses elusive, difficult and costly discovery problems for the private litigant in addition
to those of garnering documents from the creditor, cf. Hsia, suPra note 23, at 422 (ob-
stacles to obtaining creditor data on credit applicants includes privacy rights of applicants,
protective restrictions of Fair Credit Reporting Act on disclosure of applicant information
and proprietory nature of material), of conducting computer analysis of credit scoring,
of developing statistical proof, and of certifying class actions.
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therefore, counterproductive. In supporting their argument they may
invoke several facts that seem initially persuasive. First, unless the
scoring system is a poor predictor for the overrepresented group as
well, the result of modifying a partially effective system could be
a worse overall performance of the enterprise, without improved
access for protected groups."10 Further, creditors may argue that the
task of devising a scoring system that applies with equal accuracy to
all groups is costly"' and virtually impossible."112
Although these concerns are real, they are not sufficiently com-
pelling to prevail. The range of options available to the creditor
under the effects test casts doubt on the legitimacy of unmodified
credit practices that have a disparate impact. The creditor's legitimate
concern is that he not be required to assume bad risks in credit
granting simply to achieve parity with the percentage of the popu-
lation represented by protected groups. The effects-test standard pro-
posed in this Note satisfies this concern. It requires the creditor to
achieve parity only within the qualified population, which is defined
by income.
Although income is the means proposed here to identify the quali-
fied population of comparison for the prima facie case, such a tech-
nique would not require creditors to screen on the basis of an income
criterion or on any other particular basis. Although the creditor's
screening standard must relate to performance, absent a showing of
disparate impact the ECOA does not prefer one particular screening
standard or procedure to another,1la and does not prescribe that a
110. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 94 (statement of Richard Cremer,
Montgomery Ward) (eliminating age as score category would substantially increase losses);
STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 101 (credit scoring actually achieved
material reductions in loan losses typically in the 20-40% range); B. Shinkel, supra
note 89, at 133-65 (impact of removing sensitive variables, such as race and marital status,
from models based on finance-company data, may be-depending on the creditor's risk
cutoff level-some reduction of percentage of good loans predicted, increase of bad loans
accepted, and consequently some loss of profitability).
111. Cf. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 24 (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher,
member, Federal Reserve Board) (cost of credit will also be increased to extent that
alternative tests are more expensive to apply).
112. See Hsia, supra note 23, at 426 (one system may select creditworthy applicants
from one group while performing poorly for another; selection may require creditor
to make tradeoffs among protected classes); Chandler & Ewert, supra note 25 (illustrating
that differential measurement of male and female performance is means to identify
most good risks among females, especially without also increasing number of bad male
risks accepted).
113. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (Title VII) ("Courts
are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices and unless
mandated by Congress they should not attempt to do so.")
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unitary standard be more or less preferred than a multidimension-
al one.
It is true that certain predictors are more likely to be objectionable
than others. A creditor cannot take prohibited bases into account," 4
except for age and marital status under limited circumstances." 5
Predictors, such as address" 6 and credit history,117 are unusually likely
to have a disparate impact on a protected class. A creditor suspecting
that his scoring scheme will have a disparate impact may preserve
its general form if he also adds screening steps designed to mitigate
the expected disparate effects. 118 Using the means available to evaluate
the effects of screening criteria," 9 a creditor may survey specific mea-
114. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(1) (1978) ("[A] creditor shall not take a prohibited basis into
account in any system of evaluating the creditworthiness of applicants.") But see 15
U.S.C. § 169 1(c)(3) (1976) (not violation to refuse to extend credit offered pursuant to
special-purpose credit program to meet special social needs that fulfill standards pre-
scribed in regulations by Federal Reserve Board).
115. The Act allows inquiry into "marital status . . . for the purpose of ascertaining
the creditor's rights and remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit and
not to discriminate in a determination of credit-worthiness." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1) (1976).
It allows inquiry about and consideration of age in order to evaluate particular aspects
of the applicant's income, credit history, or other pertinent elements in an empirically
derived scoring scheme, if the scheme meets certain requirements, or in order to favor
elderly applicants. Id. § 1691(b)(2)-(4).
116. See notes 28 & 31 supra.
117. See notes 33 & 103 supra.
118. But see Hsia, supra note 23, at 429 (because of potentially lighter burden of
proof for an empirically derived credit system which is demonstrably and statistically
sound, users of "hybrid" system may want to bring their system under that rubric).
Many creditors who rely primarily on credit scoring employ a discretionary or judg-
mental override procedure. Cf. id. at 428 (describing general purpose of judgmental
override). The purposes of such a procedure are typically either to check the veracity
of a subset of applications or to further examine applications in the middle or lower
score range. Although such a hybrid process is a less efficient means of processing
applications than scoring alone, it is still less costly and time consuming than screening
judgmentally or obtaining credit reports for all applications.
119. Although it is not presently reasonable to expect creditors to validate or score
differentially for protected classes, see note 87 supra, this does not mean that creditors
are entirely without means to assess the differential impact of their screening strategies
and to take some steps to avoid this impact. The creditor has several bases of information
that he can use in assessing the possibility that his screening devices make access more
difficult for creditworthy members of one group than for another. First, the creditor
can evaluate the pre-Act composition of his credit-use pool, see 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(a)(1)
(1978) (not violation to retain information collected prior to Act), to determine what
kind of population he is measuring. The creditor may also have information about
group membership of present applicants from credit reports, see id. § 202.12(a)(2) (not
violation to have such information if obtained from consumer reporting agency), that
he might use to check applicant-flow composition. Second, the creditor can infer from
external information that certain of his measures correlate differently with socioeconomic
status for protected groups than for majority-group males. Third, the creditor can per-
form causal analysis on the measurement factors to determine relevant relationships
among predictive factors. See generally H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL INFERENCES IN NONEXPEPI-
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sures on which protected groups are likely to receive lower scores than
those of majority groups. The creditor may then identify related charac-
teristics that, by their positive relationship to creditworthiness, jus-
tify overriding the general statistically derived score and accepting
an otherwise low-scoring applicant. 120 When the creditor needs pre-
viously unavailable systematic data on group membership to effect
a remedial program, or when he is otherwise unable to satisfy the
requirements of the Act, he may opt, under special provisions of
the Act, 121 to adopt a special purpose credit program. In addition to
strategies to mitigate the disparate effects of old scoring systems by
systematic override procedures or special purpose programs, the cred-
itor under some circumstances might achieve the result required by
law, and at the same time continue to use the scoring scheme, if
he can market in a manner that attracts creditworthy members of
protected classes.' 22 If the creditor avoids disparate impact in this
MENTAL RESEARCH (1964) (describing techniques and limitations of quantitative analysis
for causal inference).
Although causal analysis is not presently used in credit-scoring devices, see Hsia,
supra note 23, at 383, the results of an independent analysis may aid the creditor in
assessing whether the predictive measures on which he relies may be expected to oper-
ate in the same manner for groups with different combinations of characteristics than
for his predominant sample. However, the foregoing steps will not be as effective as
differential analysis in assessing cumulative disadvantage.
120. For example, the creditor, knowing that minorities are disadvantaged by the
use of zip code, may look for factors in an application from that zip code region that
indicate that an individual is not a bad risk. Such an approach implies that a credit
application from a generally minority zip-code region will get greater scrutiny. But if
the creditor achieves a nondisparate result, the approach should not be viewed as dis-
criminatory because it imposes no greater costs on the individual applicant. But see
note 103 supra. If the creditor has in fact previously admitted protected class members,
he may be able to use his own samples to aid in generating guides for decisionmaking;
if not, he must do now what at one time he did with majority group males-work on a
hunch.
121. If the creditor finds that he is unable to achieve a satisfactory adjustment
through traditional methods or that such an adjustment imposes the risk of a reverse
discrimination suit, he may adopt a special purpose credit program. The ECOA allows
governmental, nonprofit, and profitmaking creditors to extend credit pursuant to a
special purpose credit program. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(c) (1976). Special purpose credit pro-
grams of profitmaking creditors must meet standards prescribed in regulations. Id.
§ 1691(c)(3). Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.8(a)(3) (1978), requires that profitmaking
creditors establish and administer the program pursuant to a written plan that iden-
tifies the class of persons benefited and sets forth procedures and standards. Under this
subsection, a creditor may establish a special purpose program if he shows that the class of
persons to which the program applies probably would not receive credit, or would re-
ceive credit on less favorable terms than are ordinarily available to other applicants
applying to the organization.
For an example of a special purpose program adopted before the passage of the
Amendments, see Brouillette, Response Spurs Wells Fargo to Seek Doubling of Eased-
Loan Plan for Low-Incone Persons, AM. BANKER, June 6, 1975, reprinted in 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 33, at 678.
122. See notes 66 & 69 supra.
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The extent of the business necessity defense will determine what
requirements are imposed on creditors who fail to consider the dis-
criminatory effect of their screening procedures or the effect of past
exclusionary practices. A valid business necessity defense cannot be
based on difficulties of measurement or the partial effectiveness of
a screening method. The creditor's concern with delineating a prof-
itable market is recognized by the use of a qualified pool of com-
parison, and the interests of society and the creditor in efficient and
123. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570 (1978) (employer used
affirmative recruitment techniques to achieve population parity); Davis v. Washington,
348 F. Supp. 15, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (equal protection holding) (undisputed proof of affirmative efforts to enroll
black police officers and achieve substantial parity with racial composition in recruit-
ment area).
124. The shifting burdens of proof under the effects test confirm that the general
measures for compliance suggested here are in .keeping with the law. If no disparate
impact is shown, the creditor need not justify his measures, and it remains for the
plaintiff to prove that the standards employed were applied discriminatorily to indi-
vidual cases. See p. 1466 & note 67 supra. However, one question remains: assuming
that protected class members perform better as a class than others in the creditor's
pool, can a plaintiff challenge the general screening standard by proving that the
qualifications imposed on protected classes were higher than those used for the ma-
jority group? The answer depends on what source of information is examined to deter-
mine whether higher qualifications were imposed. On the one hand, if the plaintiff
can show that the variables predicting creditworthiness used by the creditor imposed
higher standards on protected class members than on majority-group males, the answer
would be affirmative. For example, the plaintiff may show that the protected class
historically confronted difficulty in getting access to credit so that achieving credit his-
tory equal to that of white males was effectively more costly for the protected class.
In such a situation, it would be unfair for the creditor to score the credit histories
of all groups equally. If, on the other hand, the only indication that the qualifications
imposed on protected classes were higher was that protected class members evinced
the same level of achievement on predictive variables but had a better subsequent risk
performance, the answer would be negative. Cf. Los Angeles Dep't of Water 8- Power
v. Manhart, 455 U.S. 702, 708-11 (1978) (invalidating pension contribution schedule
based on sex differential mortality tables; Title VII's focus on fairness to individuals
precludes treating individuals simply as components of groups). The primary reason
is that applying an equal-performance test, based on subsequent empirical performance
results alone, in order to evaluate the creditor's standards, implies that we should allow
the creditor to distinguish individuals according to group membership and to employ
differential prediction. Otherwise he has no guidelines to determine whether lie is in
compliance with the law.
Because differential screening poses so many technical and conceptual problems of
fairness, because Regulation B forbids taking protected class membership into account,
see note 87 supra, and because unconstrained availability and use of group-membership
information would amplify the problems of regulation, the matter should be addressed
by the Federal Reserve Board and other regulatory agencies who could monitor the use
of differential prediction if, on a case-by-case basis, it were deemed appropriate.
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cost-effective screening are served because the effects test defers to
the screener's judgment so long as he avoids a disparate outcome.
The law should not go further and recognize higher cost per se
as a valid defense under the Act, except in the extreme case.125 A
broad cost-based business necessity defense would frustrate the pur-
poses of the Act. Dealing with many different groups is always more
costly than dealing with one homogeneous group because the cred-
itor is forced to consider a wider range of information and varied
patterns of characteristics. Further, he must adjust transactions to
meet group differences. Because the creditor lacks information neces-
sary to enable him to find the best possible risks in the new market,
it is necessarily more risky for him to operate there. A creditor who
previously excluded minorities and women from receipt of his credit
is forced to assume these costs; they are costs that were recognized
when the Act was passed.
Prior to the Act, the costs of nonparticipation and more difficult
access were borne solely by qualified members of protected classes.
A stringently enforced effects test would change these costs into higher
screening costs distributed to all credit users, not just disadvantaged
groups. To accomplish this purpose, a creditor must be prevented
from using his present scoring device without mitigating its disparate
effects. The fact that he cannot screen protected class members as
efficiently as he can screen the majority group cannot be a valid
excuse, because such a rule would reintroduce discriminatory prac-
tices and transfer the cost back to protected persons. In contrast,
the purpose of the Act can be effectively implemented by a judicial
standard that requires a creditor to achieve parity within a popula-
tion that by virtue of income range can be assumed to meet the
creditor's contractual requirements. The additional costs imposed
by such a standard can be borne by the creditor who ultimately will
benefit from the expansion of his applicant pool.
One legitimate concern may argue against an overly constrictive
business necessity defense. The process of removing unequal access
should not create high costs that fall on innocent third parties who
are unable to bear them. 126 In addition, reorganizing the standards
125. Cf. Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrinina-
tion in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 587-95 (1979) (discharge of older workers
based on claim that older workers with seniority impose higher costs because of higher
salaries and fringe benefits should be permitted as nondiscriminatory under Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act only if economically essential, and if less discriminatory
alternatives not practical).
126. It was argued on several occasions during the House and Senate subcommittee
hearings that creditors can and will mitigate or distribute the costs of nondiscrimination
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for distributing benefits may undermine the considerable efforts that
individual applicants have already made to meet presently used stan-
dards. Upon analysis, however, neither of these considerations pro-
vides a generally valid basis for modifying the enforcement of the
ECOA.127 The third parties who will bear costs will be individual
credit users, applicants, and investors. The position of these parties
ensures that the costs they must bear will be broadly distributed
and occur generally in small amounts that are not unduly burden-
some to each party. Credit users may experience a rise in interest
rates or the institution of more vigorous collection practices.12 - The
individual credit applicant, now competing with protected class mem-
bers for credit extensions, may suffer some short-term reduced avail-
ability of credit.129 The investor may experience a small reduction in
through expanded marketing, increased interest rates, or reduction in assumed risk.
The inherent conservatism of credit-granting practice works against expanded market-
ing; consequently, the initial costs must be distributed through interest rates or risk
reduction. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 207 (statement of Jeffrey
M. Bucher, member, Federal Reserve Board) (regulation may increase costs and reduce
available credit); 1975 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 23 (statement of Jeffrey M.
Bucher) (result of increased costs to creditor would be increased costs to other borrowers
or higher credit standards).
127. Societal reliance on costly and unique indicators of creditworthiness often cor-
responds with high expected return on a particular kind of transaction. The most dif-
ficult cases in discrimination law, see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (challenge to medical school admissions program for disadvantaged minority
groups), arise after prior discrimination and the high cost of signaling have discouraged
minority participation. See generally A. SPENCE, supra note 82, at 14-30 (education as
signal). The egregious circumstances of discrimination are counterbalanced by the high
opportunity costs that third-party applicants have already paid for such traditional in-
dicators of worth. Credit granting is not, as a general rule, based on such indicators
acquired in large part for the purpose of obtaining credit. See note 92 supra. A possible
exception arises in the housing market in which an individual may have purchased a
home in part for its investment and resale value. Even here the possibility of a total or
substantial loss on the investment caused by a modification in the credit market is not
great.
128. Another means to absorb costs by reducing losses is to impose more stringent
controls on accounts either by lowering credit limits or by monitoring accounts more
closely. See R. COLE, supra note 12, at 322-39, 366-85. Creditors who have the resources
to devise and use credit scoring may also have the computer-system capabilities to
monitor accounts and predict default by payment patterns. Such predictive monitoring
has the virtue of responding to individual behavior patterns rather than relying on
assumptions based on group characteristics and could be implemented as an educative
as well as a loss-control device.
129. The factors affecting availability of credit are complex and vary according to
kind of credit and region, among other factors. See NATIONAL COMIssION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE, supra note 18, at 109-49. One study using data from finance companies to
test the effect on access for different demographic groups of removing sensitive vari-
ables-race, marital status, age, and occupation-from a scoring device yielded results
that generally comport with the purposes of the Act. Groups whose access was improved
by removing the sensitive variables included blacks, individuals employed in driver,
service or production occupations, individuals married less than 10.5 years, and indi-
viduals under 30 years of age. Groups whose access was relatively worse with the ex-
1484
Credit Scoring
investment income. But none of these concerns are in themselves com-
pelling enough to outweigh the interests of protected classes, or of
society generally, in achieving equal access.
The concern about devaluation of efforts already made by indi-
viduals is closely related to the question of quotas. Initial attempts to
allow equal access may be tantamount to the imposition of income-
based quotas because of the lack of more sophisticated information.
However, the concerns that militate against the use of quotas in em-
ployment and higher education are seldom present in credit grant-
ing. 30 For example, the employer-employee and school-student rela-
tionships are largely exclusive; moreover, once such a commitment
is made, the unique quality of the relationship determines later
opportunities. In contrast, the creditor-debtor relationship is seldom
an exclusive one.'' Thus, the enforcement of discrimination laws
is likely to result in broader distribution of credit, rather than in
substantial exclusion of additional individuals from the credit market.
A final concern in formulating a business necessity standard is that
the social policy of ensuring access to credit for members of the low-
income population may be frustrated. Since participation in the
economy is increasingly premised on access to credit, 32 ensuring the
availability of credit to low-income individuals is an important so-
cial concern. 3  A major argument against the Act was that creditors
would inevitably raise the income floor for credit eligibility to reduce
risks and offset the cost of nondiscrimination, thereby reducing the
amount of credit available to the low-income population. 3 4 This
problem can, however, be avoided. Judicial application of the effects
test can take into account the possibility that creditors will use in-
clusion of sensitive variables included nonminorities, individuals who were single, mar-
ried, or widowed over 10.5 years, and those over 45 years of age. Effects based on sex
were not examined. See B. Shinkel, supra note 89, at 171. The groups benefited by ex-
clusion of sensitive variables were among those for whom concern was expressed during
the passage of the Act. Those disadvantaged, except for individuals over retirement age,
were those who have been historically more likely to receive credit.
130. See note 119 supra.
131. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 432 (statement of Richard E. Cremer,
Montgomery Ward).
132. 121 CONG. REc. 16,740 (1975) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) ("Credit discrimina-
tion cannot be dismissed lightly. Credit has a profound effect on the life of virtually
every person in this country. Few of us pay cash. We pay for meals, transportation,
homes, cars, hospital care, and numerous other everyday necessities through the exten-
sion of credit.").
133. See NATIONAL COsMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 18, at 156-58, 160.
134. See 1975 House Hearings, suprt note 45, at 24 (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher,
member, Federal Reserve Board) (if to meet costs creditor chooses alternative of raising
credit standards, he will deprive marginal borrowers, often those in lower-income
brackets, of access to credit).
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come standards to exclude creditworthy people with low incomes.
If such judicial safeguards are not totally effective and the amount
of credit available to low-income applicants is reduced, other mea-
sures designed to meet the special problems associated with low-
income status can be devised. Such problems do not justify contin-
ued discrimination against creditworthy individuals in other income
categories.
Various policy considerations support the strict standard advocated
here. Permitting creditors to avoid dealing with minority popula-
tions affords competitive advantages to discriminators and may injure
the overall performance of the economy. Further, credit discrimina-
tion forces underrepresented group members to segregate or curtail
participation in the economy and to seek credit at higher costs. 1'
This contributes to the cumulative disadvantage of women and mi-
norities.136
Investigations that led to the passage of the Act suggested strongly
that underrepresented groups, particularly women, promised to be an
increasingly profitable market, but that creditors were nevertheless
slow in adopting nondiscriminatory credit policies.137 This is ex-
plained, in part, by the inherent conservatism of the primary and
secondary lending industry. 38 It is also explained by the greater cost
of providing credit to a market that includes many different socio-
economic groups. 39 Part of this additional cost will be limited to the
initial cost of adjusting past practices; however, even after such adjust-
ments are made, some small costs will remain.140 It is only such costs,
which otherwise would be borne solely by members of underrepre-
sented groups, that the effects tests will impose on creditors and thus on
credit users generally.
135. See generally D. CAPLOVrTZ, supra note 98, at 180.
136. See generally C. BELL, supra note 92, at 239 (burdens of discrimination on poor);
2 G. VON FURSTENBERG, A. HOROWITZ & B. HARRISON, PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
3 (1974) (theoretical and empirical examination of relation of income to housing and
employment and effect of discrimination on socioeconomic participation of minorities).
137. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 18, at 152-53, 160.
138. Cf. id. at 139-49 (creditor costs, rates, and availability of credit) (National Com-
mission on Consumer Finance recommending adjustment of interest rate to improve
competition in market because present legal restrictions on rates have forced creditors
to adjust for costs through reducing risk, which has contributed to reduced availability).
139. Because such costs are an artifact of social organization and measurement prob-
lems over which members of protected classes have no control and to which they, as
individuals, contribute nothing, under the principles of equal access, these costs should
be distributed across the whole population.
140. For example, certain factors will always require more costly, individualized
consideration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1), (2) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)-(5) (1978).
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